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the will as though it had never been alienated. 2 Page, Wills § 1329 (2d ed. 1926).
The court in the principal case, although treating the problem as one of revocation,
reached a result which is in accord with the weight of authority. While the decision
covered only general devises, the court's language indicates that the authority of the
Clevenger case has been seriously weakened even as to special devises. The rationale
of the decisions can be reconciled only on the tenuous distinction that a subsequent
conveyance implies an intent to revoke a special devise of the property, whereas there
is no implied intention to revoke when the conveyance is of property which has been
generally devised.
Witnesses-Privileged Communication-Duty of Reporter to Disclose Name of
Informer-[New York].-The appellant, a reporter on the New York American, had
written an article concerning the "policy racket." A grand jury, then investigating
gambling and lotteries in New York, summoned the appellant as a witness. Upon his
refusal to disclose the names of persons mentioned in his article, he was adjudged
guilty of, and committed for, contempt of court. The appellant, seeking a writ of
habeas corpus, contended that the source of his information obtained as a reporter was
confidential and privileged. Held, the order dismissing the writ is affirmed; a newspaper reporter may not refuse to answer pertinent questions relating to confidential
communications. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, ig N.E. 415
(N.Y. 1936).
The proper decision of a particular case requires the disclosure of all relevant data.
A privilege from testifying will therefore be denied unless some strong reasons of public
policy (e.g., the desire to protect the confidential nature of a certain relationship) merit
more consideration than the desire to secure all the information in the individual case.
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (2d ed. 3923). The principal case is in line with the unanimous common law authority which regarded the policy arguments in favor of holding
privileged confidential communications to newspapermen as inferior to those calling
for the disclosure of all pertinent information. In re Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Hawaii 475
(1914); Ex pare Lawrence, r16 Cal. 298, 48 Pac. 124 (1897); Pledger v. State, 77 Ga.
242, 3 S.E. 320 (1887); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (i911); Inye
Grunow, 84 N.J. L. 235, 85 Atl. ioii (1913). It has been argued, however, that in

making available the news necessary for the enlightenment of public opinion, especially as to matters involving the conduct of community and governmental affairs,
journalists perform a valuable service that should be encouraged. See 45 Yale L. J.
357, 36o (i935). Influenced by this feeling, four states have by statute changed the
orthodox rule so that *confidential communications to newspapermen are absolutely
privileged. Alabama (See New York Times, Jan. 8, 1936, p. 6); Calif. Stats. '935,
c. 532, § 6; Bagby's Md. Ann. Code 1924 c. 35, § 2; N.J. Acts. 1933, c. 167, § 2. But
see Governor Homer's veto of such a bill for Illinois. 68 Ed. & Pub. i8 (July 20, 1935).

The conflict between those who would deny all privileges and those who would grant
an absolute privilege to journalists might perhaps be resolved by the recognition of a
privilege similar to that accorded in government official and informer cases. A privilege
is there granted to encourage people to communicate to the proper officials whatever
information they may have concerning crimes in which the government is interested.
In the absence of a privilege protecting the informant's identity, the information would
not be volunteered because of the informant's fear that those against whom he had
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given information would initiate prosecutions or instigate persecutions. But this
privilege, unlike other common law privileges, is not absolute. Wilson v. U.S., 65 F.
(2d) 62X (C.C.A. 3 d 1933); Centoamore v. State, 1o5 Neb. 452, 181 N.W. 182 (1920);
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 (2d ed. 1923). It may be granted or denied as the interests
of justice, in view of the circumstances of the particular case, demand. The granting
of a similar conditional privilege in newspaper cases might reconcile the policies of
securing complete testimonial information and of making available all information
necessary for the formulation of public opinion on matters of governmental and community concern. This rule of conditional privilege might be stated as follows: No
person employed on a newspaper shall be compelled to disclose, at any trial or other
proceeding, the source of confidential information relating t6 public affairs obtained by
him for, and published in, the newspaper with which he is connected, unless it shall appear that the disclosure of said source will not result in any serious injury, either
financial or personal, to the individual imparting such information to said newspaper
employee. Such a rule would encourage the communication of information that would
not, in the absence of the privilege, have been revealed; yet it would permit the court to
compel the disclosure of information necessary for the just disposition of a case when,
in the opinion of the court, the informant would not be seriously harmed.

